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'IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. 
- FEBRUARY 25, 1881.-0rdered to be·printed. 
Mr. D.A. vrs, of Illinois, from the Committee on Private Land Claims, sub-
. mitted the following 
REPORT: 
[To accompany bill S. 14~9.] 
The Committee on Private Land Claims, to whom was referred 'the bill ( S. 
1429), entitled ''A bill for the relief of Sarah McDonald," have had the 
same under consideration, and submit the following report : 
Sundry papers have been laid before the committee, among them being 
a communication from the Secretary of the Interior, inclosing a report 
to him from the Commissioner of the General Land Office, touching the 
subject-matter of the bill. 
It appears that Alexander McDonald, of whom said Sarah is the 
widow and sole heir, purchased from the Leavenworth, Lawrence and 
Galveston Railroad Compauy certain land in the State of Kansas, known 
and described as follows: Northwest quarter of section 11, and section 
13 in township 29 south, of range 18 east, paying therefor $4,770.75, and 
that he purchased from the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Com-
pany other land in that State, known and described as lots Nos. 1 and 
2, paying therefor $135.50, and that the companies conveyed to him by 
deed in fee the land purchased of them, respectively. 
The companies claimed title to the lands as follows: Congress by an 
act approved March 3, 1863 (12 Statutes at Large, 772), granted to 
Kansas lauds in alternate sections to aid in the construction of certain 
railroads in that State. The latter, by her statute of February 9, 1864, 
accepted the grant, and designated the Leavenworth, Lawrence and 
Galveston Railroad Company to construct one of the projected roads, 
and receive the land grant upon the prescribed terms and conditions. 
The governor of the State certified to the Secretary of the Interior, 
September 21, 1871, that the company had filed a map and constructed 
and equipped the road as required by the grant. Certified lists, which 
by statute (10 id., 346) have the force and effect of a patent, were; with 
the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, made out by the Com-
missioner of the General Land Office for the alternate sections of land 
within the designated limits of the road, on the certificate of the gov-
ernor, under date of September 21, 1871, that the road had been con-
structed and equipped as required by Congress. The governor, April 
7, 1872, and March 21, 1873, conveyed the lands so certified to the rail-
road company. 
The route of the road passed through the Osage Reservation, which 
the Secretary of the Interior decided, January 16,1872, was not excluded 
from the operation of the grant. The latter, therefore, as it was con- . 
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strued and executed by the Land Department, emuraced all the lanus 
of the reservation whieh are situate within certain specified limits on 
each side of the road, and, as we have seen, the company was furnished 
with the customary evidence of title to them. It then sold and con-
veyed to :McDonaicl the section first above mentioned, situated within 
the reservation. 
The United States subsequently filed a bill to establish its title to the 
lands within tlle reservation, which were certified to the governor of 
Kansas, and uy him cmrveyed to the company. The latter was made a 
party defendant. 
The Supreme Court, the case coming before it on appeal, decided that 
the grant did not em b1 ace any part of those lands. The uecree of the 
court of original jurisdiction enjoining the defendant fi·om setting up 
any right or claim to them was affirmed. (Leavenworth, Lawrence and 
Ga.Iveston Railroad Company vs. United States, 2 Otto, 733.) 
The same remarks are applicable to the grant to the Missouri, Kansas 
and Texas Railway Company by the act of Congress of July 25, 1866. 
(14 Statutes at Ijarge, p. 289.) 
The Supreme Court, in 2 Otto, 760, again declared that the grant did 
not include any lands within the reservation. Lots Nos.l and 2, which 
McDonald purchased, are within it. The company's conveyance to him 
pass no title. l\1 cDonald was not a party to those suits, and is not 
thereby bound; but inasmuch as the decrees were rendered by the court 
of last resort, and the action of the Land Department in certifying the 
lands in question was pronounced to be without authority of law and 
ineffectual to pass any right whatever to the company, an attempt by 
his widow to maintain her title against the United States, or a party 
lawfully claiming under them, by a valid patent would be idle and 
unavailing. The only question, therefore, for determination is whether 
Mrs. McDonald is entitled to relief, and, if so, whether it should be such 
as this bill provides. 
McDonald, no doubt, acted in the full conviction that the company 
had a good title. The conviction was founded upon the action of that 
department of the government which is intrusted with the supervision 
and control of the public domain and the execution of the laws respect-
ing it. He paid full value for the lands, ootered upon and improved 
them, surrounded most of them with a hedge, and appropriated the 
remainder for gra~ing purposes. 
· Under such circumstances, a purchaser in good faith, or his heir, pre-
sents a case which is entitled to the most favorable consideration, espe-
cially as his grantor is·tmable to respond in damages. 
Precedents for the action of Congress can be found in our legislation. 
We need only refer to a recent and conspicuous instance. Congress by 
au act approved :March 3, 1866 (12 Statutes at Large, 808), granted the 
right of pre-emption to certain purchasers on the '' Soscol Ranch," in 
the State of California. That tract, covering about eig-hteen square 
leagnet-;, was occupied by parties claiming under General Vallejo, to 
whom a grant was made by officers of the Mexican Government. The 
grant was pronounced uy the Supreme Uourt at the December term, 
1861, to be void. Congress immediately passed the act authorizing 
parties who had purchased from him in good faith to enter their land at 
the minimum price. By virtue of the act of Congress of :March 3,1851 
(9 id., 6.33), the land became on the final rejection of the claim a part of 
the public domain; but the right of such purchasers who complied with 
the requirements of the act of Congress and remained in possession 
were held by the Supreme Court superior to tllat set up by parties who 
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had intruded upon such possession and claimed a preference right to 
purchase under the general pre-emption laws. 
OongreSB, by the act of August 11, 1876 (19 id., 127), provided for the 
sale of the Osage ceded land~ to actual settlers. It conferred upon 
those whose title is derived from either of the railroad companies, be-
fore February 25, 1874, and where the consideration money or a part 
thereof was paid, and who have made in good faith valuable and last-
ing improvements, the right to purchase the lands not exceeding 160 
acres, to include their improvements. Their right to purchase is coupled 
with certain condition upon which it is not material that the committee 
should dwell. Their right attaches from the date of payment to the 
railroad companies. It is limited, it will be perceived, to 160 acres. 
The case under consideration is one of peculiar merit. Mrs. McDon-
ald, although Ler husband paid for the lands and she remains in pos-
session of them, cannot under our laws perfect her title to more than 
160 acres. 
The committee are of opinion that she should be granted the right to 
purchase the lands conveyed by the railroad companies to her husband. 
The terms and conditions prescribed in the act as to purchase money 
should be enforced, except so much of them as relates to the quantity, 
or, in other words, that the limitation as to quantity for which that act 
provides should be removed. 
It may be said, however, that other parties may have settled upon 
parts of the lands included in the McDonald purchase and taken the· 
requisite steps to acquire a title thereto under the provisions of that act. 
As Mr. :McDonald was in actual possession, which si.nce his death has been 
continued by his widow, under color of title emanating from the Land 
Department, it may be somewhat questionable under the decision of 
the Supreme Court in Atherton vs. Fowler (6 Otto, 513) whether an 
adverse pre-emption right could have been acquired. That case asserts 
the doctrine that no right of pre-emption can be established by a set-
tlement and improvement on a tract of public land where the claimant 
forcibly intrudeu upon the possession of one who had already settled 
upon, improved, and inclosed that tract. Such an intrusion, though 
made under the pretense of pre-empting the land, is declared by the 
court to be an unlawful trespass which cannot initiate a right of pre-
emption. No interest is, in any event, vested in the settler before be 
has complied with all the requirements of the pre-emption laws and 
paid for the land. Until this has been done, it remains subjeCt to the 
disposing power of Congress. It would seem, therefore, to be a grievous 
hardship to Mrs. :McDonald to permit parties to enter upon the lands 
and appropriate the improvements put upon them by the money and 
labor of her husband. 
The report of the Commissioner of the General Land Office accom-
panying the communication from the Secretary of the Interior recom-
mends the passage of the bill, and the Secretary of the Interior ·concurs 
in that recommendation. 
The committee, while concurring in the principle of the uiil referred 
to them, find it defective in its present shape, and have instructed me 
to report a substitute for it, and to recommend its passage. 
